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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the Public Service Commission of Utah ("PSCU")

properly dismissed the application of American Paging, Inc. of
Utah ("American Paging") for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate one-way paging service for the
reason that the PSCU lacks regulatory jurisdiction over one-way
paging services?
II.

Whether the PSCU properly complied with the Utah

Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code ^nn. § 63-46a-l (1985)
et seq. by issuing Rule No. 8304, which interprets the Commission's lack of statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging
services?
III. Whether the Public Telecommunications Utility Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l (1985) et seg. affects the PSCU's lack
of statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging?
IV.

Whether PSCU Rule No. 8304 affects the constitutional

due process rights of former one-way pagihg certificate holders?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The statutory provisions relevant to a determinative
resolution of the present case are:

(1) Utah Code Ann.

§ 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986), attached as!Addendum A; (2) Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(2) and (3) (1985), attached as Addendum B;
and (3) S.B. No. 102, Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l et seg. (1985),
attached as Addendum C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari brought by David R.
Williams d/b/a Industrial Communications ("Industrial") seeking
review of PSCU Rule No. 8304 and of the PSCU's Order issued in
Case No. 85-2007-01 based upon an alleged failure to comply
with proper Rulemaking procedures.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the PSCU has a history of acceding to requests for
certificates of authority to operate one-way paging
services,1 the PSCU did not ever interpret the scope of its
statutory jurisdiction relative to one-way paging services
until 1983.

(R. at 236-37.)

The prior unwitting grant of

one-way paging authority under the guise of certificates of
authority did not constitute an interpretation of jurisdiction,
but rather, was simply an assent to requests for certificates
of convenience and necessity.

Williams v. Public Service

Commission, 720 P.2d 773, 774

In a summary of the history of PSCU accession to requests
for certificates of authority to operate one-way paging
services, this Court noted that the PSCU "assumed" jurisdiction over one-way and two-way paging by granting certificates of public convenience and necessity to 4 dual
services companies and one single authority company. On
other occasions, the PSCU denied requests for certificates. Thus, the PSCU granted a total of 5 certificates,
only one of which was a single authority certificate
granting authority to operate a one-way paging service.
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773, 774
(Utah 1986) .
-?-

(Utah 1986).

A copy of the Williams case is attached as

Addendum D.
In May of 1983, American Paging Inc. of Utah ("American
Paging") contacted the PSCU to inquire whether American Paging
could operate a commercial one-way paging system without a
certificate of public convenience and necessity.

Pursuant to

its determination that no certificate is required, the PSCU
informed American Paging in a letter dated June 3, 1983, that
the PSCU has no statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging
services.

Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 720

P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986) .
Later in 1983, Page America, Inc., another paging company,
filed an application with the PSCU to provide one-way paging
service.

On November 28, 1983, after a full hearing and

receipt of extensive argument on the issue, the PSCU ruled that
it had no statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging and
dismissed the Page America application.

!The PSCU's dismissal

of the Page America Application was subsequently appealed to
the Utah Supreme Court.

(R. at 235-37.)

A copy of the Page

America decision and order is attached as Addendum E.
On April 30, 1985, while the Wi1liams case was still
pending, American Paging filed an application with the PSCU to
obtain authority to provide one-way paging service to the
general public.

American Paging simultaneously filed a motion
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to dismiss its application for the reason that the PSCU, in its
Order of November 28, 1983, determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services.

The PSCU

granted American Paging's motion reaffirming its prior jurisdictional determination and, in addition, concluded that the
1985 Utah Legislature's addition of Chapter 8b to the Utah
Public Utilities Act did not expand the PSCU's statutory
jurisdiction beyond that previously held; thus, the PSCU still
did not have jurisdiction over one-way paging.

(R. at 236-37.)

On March 4, 1986, this Court ruled in Williams that the
PSCU failed to adhere to proper rulemaking requirements when
interpreting the scope of its jurisdiction over one-way paging.

Accordingly, this Court remanded the matter for further

rulemaking proceedings which would comport with the applicable
procedural requirements of the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(R. at 236-37, and Williams, 720 P.2d at 773-74.)
Pursuant to this Court's direction in Williams, the PSCU
filed a notice of proposed rulemaking with the Office of
Administrative Rules.

(R. at 20.)

A copy of Rule 8304 and the

signed recommendation that it be adopted are attached as
Addendum F.

Notice of the proposed Rule was published in the

Utah Bulletin on April 15, 1986, stating that the Commission
does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging and the reasons
for such rule.

Notice was provided to the parties, and no

party requested a hearing on the rule within the fifteen day
period following publication of the propdsed rule as required
by the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

Industrial did,

however, file its written objection to the Rule.

The juris-

dictional Rule was then formally adopted and made effective
May 16, 1986.

(R. at 20 and 236-42).

On May 23, 1986, the PSCU issued its Order granting
American Paging's motion to dismiss its application for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity because the
PSCU lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging services.

The PSCU

determined that American Paging should be allowed to provide
one-way paging services to the citizens of Utah because of Rule
8304, issued pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act
and in accordance with the directions of this Court.

The PSCU

further concluded that the provisions of Chapter 8b of the
Public Utilities Act did not expand the jurisdiction of the
PSCU to include one-way paging.

Thus, there was no attempt to

deregulate one-way paging under Chapter 8b of the Public
Utilities Act; the PSCU simply interpreted its lack of statutory jurisdiction pursuant to administrative rulemaking procedures as described by this Court in the Williams decision.
at 235-37.)

(R.

A copy of PSCU Order Granting Motion to Dismiss is

attached as Addendum G.
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On June 13, 1986, David R. Williams d/b/a Industrial
Communications ("Industrial") petitioned this Court for review
of the PSCU's adoption of Rule 8304.

On the same day, Indus-

trial petitioned this Court for review of the PSCU Order
granting American Paging's motion to dismiss its application
for certificate of public convenience and necessity.
265-66.)

(R. at

The two said petitions are now consolidated for

review by this court as Supreme Court Case Nos. 860313 and
860314.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
PSCU LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER ONE-WAY PAGING:

Based upon

its experience and expert knowledge in the field of utilities
regulation, the PSCU, through Rule 8304, determined that it
lacks regulatory jurisdiction over one-way paging services.
The PSCU's statutory interpretation is correct because:

(1)

the PSCU never engaged in deregulation proceedings, but rather,
interpreted its lack of jurisdiction over one-way paging
through rulemaking; (2) one-way paging does not fall within the
Public Utilities Act, Chapter 2 definitions of utilities
services which are subject to PSCU regulatory jurisdiction; (3)
a history of infrequent PSCU accession to requests for certificates of authority cannot create jurisdiction in violation of
legislative enactments; and finally (4) the great weight of
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case authority demonstrates that one-way paging services are
not public utilities services and are not subject to PSCU
regulatory jurisdiction under relevant Utah statutes.
PSCU COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS:

The PSCU, in

accord with the instruction of the Utah Supreme Court, properly
interpreted its lack of statutory jurisdiction over one-way
paging pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

The

PSCU did not engage in exemption proceedings under Chapter 8b
of the Telecommunications Act; rather, the PSCU complied with
and fulfilled all judicial, legislative and procedural requirements of the Administrative Rulemaking Act in determining that
the PSCU lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging services.
CHAPTER 8b OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT DOES NOT ENLARGE
PSCU JURISDICTION:

Consistent with a policy of regulatory

restraint, Chapter 8b of the Telecommunications Utility Act
does not "enlarge or reduce" the PSCU's previously held
jurisdiction.

Therefore, the unambiguous language of the Act

itself clearly demonstrates that Chapter 8b does not affect the
PSCU's lack of regulatory jurisdiction over one-way paging.
Departure from the literal meaning of the Act would result in
unjust and absurd over-regulation of non-utilities, inconsistent with the purposes and policies of PSCU regulation of
public utilities.
PSCU RULE 8304 DOES NOT VIOLATE INDUSTRIAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS:

PSCU Rule 8304 does not constitute a

government interference with Industrial's property interests.
Because the primary expectation of Industrial's property
interest (a PSCU certificate of public convenience and necessity) is the authority to operate a one-way paging service,
Rule 8304 not only leaves Industrial's property interest
undisturbed, but it also relieves Industrial from the burden o
any state government regulation or interference.

Thus, PSCU

Rule 8304 is constitutional.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PSCU PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT IT HAS NO
STATUTORY JURISDICTION TO REGULATE ONE-WAY
PAGING SERVICES.
A.

The PSCU Was Justified In Interpreting Its Lack of
Statutory Authority To Regulate One Way Paging And
Should Not Be Estopped From Making Such Interpretatio

In Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2
781, 784 (1965), this Court stated the applicable standard of
review governing PSCU interpretation of the Public Utilities
Act:
[T]he interpretation and application of statutes
adopted by the administrative agency is usually looked
upon with some indulgence. It is both just and
practical that the Board should be allowed considerable latitude of discretion in deciding what policies
will best carry out the responsibilities imposed upon
it. Due to the consideration just stated, and because
of its experience and presumed expert knowledge in its
field, an administrative interpretation and application of a statute, although not necessarily controlling, is generally regarded as prima facie correct and
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should not to be overturned so long as it is in
conformity with the general objectives the agency is
charged with carrying out, and there is a rational
basis for it in the provisions of law.
See also PBI Freight Service v. Public Service Commission of
Utah, 598 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah 1979).
In disregard of the applicable standard of review, the
experience and expert knowledge of the PSCU and the weight of
current case authority, Industrial urges this court to overturn
PSCU Rule No. 8304 and cites as authority Husky Oil Company of
Delaware v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah
1976).

However, an analysis of the jurisdictional issue in the

instant case demonstrates that the Husky decision is not
applicable, Rule 8304 was created in conformity with the
general objectives of the PSCU, and Rule 8304 is based upon
sound legal principles.
First, the Husky decision concerned a radical departure
from a specific administrative rule upon which the public had
relied and which was consistently followed.

In the instant

case, there is no such radical departure from an administrative
rule because the PSCU has never ruled that it has jurisdiction
over one-way paging services.

Furthermore, the PSCU's acces-

sion to requests for certificates of authority to operate
one-way paging services was mostly incidental.

The facts

reflect that the PSCU's mere consent to grant certain requests
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for certificates of authority to operate one-way services was
only sporadic, and was actually an unwitting violation of
statutory authority.

Indeed, the PSCU granted only one

requested certificate that covered only one-way paging.
Williams, 720 P.2d at 774.
Prior to 1983, neither the PSCU nor the Courts had ever
specifically interpreted the PSCU's statutory jurisdiction over
commercially offered one-way paging.
Point IIA(l).

See Argument infra at

It is important to note that with respect to the

subject jurisdictional issue, this Court has held in circumstances in which a state agency interprets the application of
statute imposed upon it that such agency is entitled to "considerable latitude of discretion" and that "considerations of
policy are primarily the responsibility of the Commission."
P.B.I. Freight Service, 598 P.2d at 1354.
The Husky decision is also distinguished from the instant
case for the reason that in Husky, the State Tax Commission had
actually promulgated formal Regulation S-38 in 1937, exempting
certain sales transactions from taxation.

Later in 1971, the

State Tax Commission deleted the exemption from the regulation
and added language making the previously exempted transactions
taxable.

Husky, 556 P.2d at 1270.

In addition, two Supreme

Court decisions acknowledged the validity of the 1937 S-38
exemption regulation and its impact on relevant statutes.

-10-

Id.

The instant case is not comparable.

First, the PSCU never

articulated a formal rule or statement respecting jurisdiction
over one-way paging prior to 1983.

Thus, the PSCU did not

depart from any prior determination, but rather, conformed to
its 1983 statutory interpretation of jurisdiction.

Addition-

ally, this court has never acknowledged or upheld PSCU assertion of jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging.

This

Court even made mention of the fact that it has never addressed
the substantive issue of whether the Public Utilities Act gives
the PSCU jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging services.
In Medi-Call, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d
273, 470 P.2d 258, 260-261 (1970); this court held that it:
did not reach the issue of whether a publicly available paging service, . . . would be a public utility
because [its] holding was limited to the private
nature of arrangements before [it].
However, the majority of other jurisdictions that have
addressed this specific issue have held that one-way paging
services do not constitute a public utility service and should
not be subject to regulation.

44 A.L.R.4th 216, 220-222 (1986).

Second, because one-way paging is not a public utility
under the Chapter 2 definitions of the Public Utilities Act,
the PSCU cannot regulate it regardless of any unwitting
historical regulation.

Under the definitions of Chapter 2 of

the Utah Public Utilities Act, the PSCU either has jurisdiction
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or it does not have jurisdiction.

The PSCU cannot acquire or

create statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging which the
legislature did not give it, simply by the unwitting assumption
thereof.

To hold otherwise makes statutory jurisdiction mean-

ingless.

Under such a holding, jurisdiction could be con-

stantly subjected to change based upon the whim of any entity
choosing to assert jurisdiction in violation of governing
statutes, so long as the entity is allowed to continue such
assertion over a period of time.

This Court should reject such

a holding because it displaces and overpowers the Utah Legislature's lawmaking function.

Lack of statutory jurisdiction over

one-way paging, coupled with the fact that one-way paging does
not constitute a public utility service under Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-2-1 (1986) are the most cogent reasons of all for a PSCU
determination that it lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging.
Therefore, because the PSCU is not departing from any prior
determination and because cogent reasons justify PSCU action,
Rule 8304 is valid and enforceable.
Additionally, the PSCU should not be estopped from interpreting the scope of its statutory jurisdiction because (1)
Industrial's operation of one-way paging services and expectations related thereto remain unaffected by Rule 8304; (2)
Industrial has not suffered any injury as a result of PSCU
cancellation of certificates; and (3) Industrial had no right
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to rely upon its certificate of public convenience and necessity as a means of either achieving or maintaining a monopoly
status.
Industrial claims that it has expended great sums of money
to develop a paging service and that it would not have developed such service without authority.

Industrial then cites

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 6 02
P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) as authority for the proposition that the
PSCU should be estopped from containing its regulation within
statutory limits, and urges this Court to prevent the PSCU from
cancelling Industrial's certificate of authority to operate
one-way paging services.
Industrial's reliance on the Celebrity Club decision is
misplaced.

Celebrity Club is inapplicable under the facts of

the instant case because it involved a situation in which the
Celebrity Club, pursuant to Commission authorization, expended
great sums of money to complete construction of a business and
was then completely denied authority to operate the business as
promised.

Celebrity Club, 602 P.2d at 689-90.

case, Industrial has suffered no such injury.

In the instant
Industrial may

make complete use of its facilities and paging operations
without any PSCU interference.

Moreover, Industrial may engage

in operation of one-way paging services without the burden of
regulation.

Therefore, because Industrial has suffered no
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injury as a result of Rule 8304, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot properly be invoked.

Celebrity Club, 602 P.2d at 694

(holding that injury based on just reliance is an essential
element of equitable estoppel).
The only right upon which Industrial supposedly relied was
the right to a monopoly status in the one-way paging market.
But no such right ever existed.

The record reflects that

one-way paging was, and is, a competitive market, into which
the PSCU could have allowed even greater access.
P.2d at 774.

Williams, 720

Because one-way paging has been a competitive

market, Industrial could have no expectation of monopoly
status.

Based on public need and desirability, even assuming

jurisdiction over one-way paging, the PSCU could at any time
grant additional certificates of authority.
The fact that Industrial was required to comply with PSCU
rules and regulations, file tariffs and pay sales tax only more
forcefully demonstrates that the PSCU's adoption of Rule 8304
serves to alleviate the burdens of regulation previously placed
upon Industrial, rather than to injure Industrial's one-way
paging system.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel can

not be

invoked to protect nonexistent rights upon which Industrial
unjustifiably relies.
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B.

PSCU Rule No. 8304 Is Valid Because One-Way Paging
Does Not Constitute A Public Utility And Is Not
Subject To PSCU Regulatory Jurisdiction.

The Public Utilities Act vests authority in the PSCU to
regulate everything which constitutes a public utility within
the purview of the Act.

Public Utility Commission v. Garvloch,

54 Utah 406, 181 P. 272, 276 (1919).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1

(1986) enumerates the utilities which are subject to PSCU
jurisdiction and regulation.

The relevant sections of the

Public Utilities Act for the purposes of the instant case are
§ 54-2-1(30) and (31) which gives the commission regulatory
jurisdiction over "telephone corporations owning, controlling,
operating or managing any telephone line."
A telephone corporation is defined as "every corporation
and person . . . owning, controlling, operating, or managing
any telephone line for public service within this state.
. . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) (1986).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(31) (1986) defines a telephone line
as:
all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments
and appliances, and all other real estate and fixtures
and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or
managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone whether such communication is had
with or without the use of transmission wires.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the critical factors for determining what constitutes
a telephone corporation which makes use of a telephone line are
(1) whether or not a corporation controls, operates or manages
-15-

a "telephone line;" (2) whether the corporation's activities
constitute telephonic communications; and (3) whether one-way
paging systems make use of a telephone line for transmissions
"in connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone. "
Generally accepted principles of statutory construction
provide that a statute ought to be read according to its plain
meaning.

AFLCIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Applying the "plain meaning" principle, the PSCU excluded
one-way paging services from the above definition of telephone
corporation because such services do not utilize a telephone
line.

(R. at 20.)

Two compelling reasons justify PSCU's decision.

First, the

statute calls for use of telephone equipment "in connection
with or to facilitate communication by telephone," which
contemplates two-way interactive communication, not just
message transmission.

Second, one-way paging does not consti-

tute two-way interactive communication achieved by using
equipment "in connection with or to facilitate communication by
telephone."

See In Re Cincinnati Radiotelephone Systems, Inc.,

341 N.E.2d 826 (Ohio 1976).

In Radiotelephone, the court held

that where a one-way radio paging service broadcasts a radio
signal from its own transmitter to a subscriber's pager, which
the subscriber carries in his pocket, causing the pager to emit
a beep which alerts the subscriber to make a telephone call,
-16-

such signal was not a 'telephone message* within the meaning of
the statute, even though the radio paging service was interconnected to a landline telephone facility for the sole purpose of
transmitting signaling instructions from the telephone company's automatic answering device to the radio paging service's
transmitter.

The court further found that a company engaged in

the business of providing such a one-way radio paging service
to its subscribers was not a "telephone company" nor a "public
utility" within the meaning of its public utility statute.
The one-way paging process is accomplished by storing a
message with a service, which either notifies the paging
customer that the message is waiting, or sends the message
directly to the customer.

In either case, the customer cannot

interactively communicate with the caller as with "communication by telephone."

Therefore, one-way paging does not con-

stitute telephonic communication.
In conformity with this statutory analysis, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Commission, 447 N.E.2d 295, 296-297 (111.
1983), held that one-way paging systems do not come under
Public Service Commission jurisdiction because the paging
device cannot be used to carry on a two-way conversation and
is, thus, not used "for or in connection with . . . the transmission of telegraph or telephone messages."

The same distinc-

tion was made in In Re Answerphone of Kansas City, Inc., 87 PUR
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3d 164 (Mo. PSC 1970); and Radio Telephone Communications, Inc.
v. Southeastern Telephone, 170 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1964).
By analogy, the function performed by a one-way paging
service is essentially the same as the function performed by
other non-regulated one-way communications services, such as
telephone answering services.
and competitive markets.

Such services operate in open

The Illinois Supreme Court referred

to the similarity between one-way paging service and telephone
answering services, indicating the lack of authority or need
for Commission regulation:
The paging service is but a recipient of a telephone
call, and the service simply notifies its subscriber
of the call. The Commission having reconsidered and
concluded . . . that the paging company is in reality
only an answering service with sophisticated equipment. (The only unique aspect of the service offered
by paging businesses, the Commission argued in the
appellate court, involves the use of radio signals,
and the use of radio frequencies is licensed federally.) (Citation omitted.)
Illinois Consolidated, 447 N.E.2d at 298.
The definition of "telephone line" as contained in the Utah
statute includes equipment and property "operated or managed in
connection with or to facilitate communications by telephone."
The PSCU adopted a reasonable definition of the terms "in
connection with" and "facilitate" as used in the statute.

A

broad and unchecked definition of such terms leads to unintended and absurd results.

The absurdity of a broad definition

of the term "facilitate" is noted by the Illinois Supreme Court:
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The Commission points out that the publishers of
telephone classified directories, such as legal or
medical directories also facilitate telephone communication, but it could hardly be said that those publishers were intended by the legislature to be considered public utilities. Similarly it could be said
that simple answering services aid and facilitate
telephone communication. But it is obvious that the
nature of the service is not a functional part of the
transmission of message by telephone, nor is radio
paging. (Emphasis added.)
Illinois Consolidated, 447 N.E.2d at 298.
The terms "in connection with" and "facilitate" as used in
the Utah statute should be interpreted with common sense and
applied only to that equipment and property used directly in
the transmission of a two-way telephone communication.

Other-

wise, no reasonable limit to the PSCU regulatory function in
connection with telephone service can be attained.
The Illinois Supreme Court is not alone in its refusal to
assert jurisdiction over one-way paging services.

In Appeal of

Omni-Communications, Inc., 451 A.2d 1289 (N.H. 1982) the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that the Public Utilities Commission "PUC") had no authority to regulate the use of radio
pagers.

Reviewing the statutory, legislative and constitu-

tional history, the court concluded that in enacting the
statutory definition of public utility the legislature did not
intend to place all companies and businesses somehow related to
telephones under the umbrella of PUC regulatory power.

The

court further held that by attempting to regulate radio-pagers,
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the Commission was "demonstrating the very behavior it was
established to prevent:

interference and disruption of free

market private enterprise."

Icl.

at 1291.

In Ram Broadcasting v. Michigan Public Service Commission,
317 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. App. 1982), the Michigan court considered
the statutory term "telephone company" in the context of the
whole act and concluded that the legislature did not intend to
include radio-pagers in the scope of the commission's jurisdiction over public utilities.

The court pointed out that the

distinguishing factor between radio paging systems and telephone companies that make use of telephone lines is that radio
common carriers do not employ, connect, sell, lease or construct lines.

Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of

the circuit court, affirming the order of the commission that
it was without power to regulate radio common carriers.
In In Re Cincinnati Radiotelephone Systems, Inc., 341
N.E.2d 826 (Ohio 1976), the Ohio Supreme Court reversed its
Public Service Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over
one-way pagers because the services were no different than
answering services except for the replacement of a human
operator with an answering machine.

The signal transmitted by

the paging service was not treated as a "telephonic message,"
and was therefore held not to be a public utility.
The current trend of cases and authority strongly supports
the jurisdictional determination that the PSCU has no statutory
-20-

authority to regulate one-way paging.

Thus, one-way paging

communications do not constitute the necessary telephonic
communications, such that one-way paging should be subject to
state regulation as a public utility under Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986).

See 44 A.L.R.4th 216, 220-223

(1986).
Aside from legalistic and precedential arguments adopted by
the PSCU in determining its lack of jurisdiction over one-way
paging, the PSCU adopted a basic common sense interpretation of
its statutory jurisdiction.

One-way paging service has none of

the characteristics which requires either the need for control,
or the public protection to justify "utility" regulation.
One-way paging services do not require a dedication of scarce
public resources such as public rights-of-way for pipelines,
railroad tracks or wireline poles.

Numerous paging frequencies

are available so as to allow multiple simultaneous services in
a competitive market.

Moreover, one-way paging is not an

essential public service which requires regulatory protection
against destructive competition.

Rather, it is a convenience

service which is relatively easy and inexpensive to initiate.
There is no danger that any bona fide need for such a service
would not be accommodated in a competitive market.

There is,

therefore, no public policy or common sense justification for
subjecting one-way paging to the rigors of utility regulation.
Such was part of the wisdom of the PSCU in its interpretation
-21-

of legislative intent and statutory jurisdiction relative to
one-way paging services.
POINT II
PSCU RULE NO. 8304 IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE
AND WAS FORMULATED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL
JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT.
A.

The PSCU Properly Interpreted Its Jurisdiction Pursuant To The Administrative Rulemaking Act and Did Not
Engage In Deregulation Or Exemption Under Chapter 8b
Of the Telecommunications Utility Act.

In Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 72 0 P.2d
773 (Utah 1986), this Court ruled that the PSCU's interpretation of its statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging services
must be implemented pursuant to the procedures set forth in the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

This Court specifically

declared that:
"[w]e agree that the Commission failed to adhere to
proper requirements in ruling on the jurisdictional
issue, and accordingly reverse and remand for a new
hearing that comports with the applicable statutes."
Williams, 720 P.2d at 773.

The only applicable statutes to

which this Court referred were the provisions of the Administrative Rulemaking Act.

Id.

The acts of the PSCU in issuing Rule No. 8304 must be
characterized as jurisdictional interpretation by "Rulemaking"
and not as exemption by "Deregulation."

For this reason, the

PSCU issued Rule No. 8304 pursuant to the requirements of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-l et
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seg. (1985), and did not engage in deregulation proceedings
pursuant to Chapter 8b of the Telecommunications Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 54-8b-l et se^. (1985).
A critical distinction between interpretation of statutory
jurisdiction through Rulemaking and exemption through Deregulation must be made.

In 1983, the relevant time period, the PSCU

had no authority to "deregulate" any public utility because the
provisions of Utah Code Ann § 54-8b-l et_ seg. (1985) which
grants the PSCU power to exempt a utility service from its
regulatory jurisdiction had not been enacted.

Consequently,

this Court's direction to the PSCU in Williams concerned
Rulemaking, not Deregulation.

Industrial's argument fails to

distinguish between Rulemaking and Deregulation under the
relevant statutes for at least two reasons:

(1) Industrial

erroneously states that the effect of the PSCU's Order was to
deregulate a regulated industry by administrative fiat; and
(2) Industrial confuses rulemaking concerning statutory jurisdiction and exemption by deregulation.
1.

The PSCU has now properly interpreted its lack -of
jurisdiction over one-way paging through Rulemaking, not by Administrative fiat.

In 1983, for the first time, the PSCU interpreted the scope
of its statutory jurisdiction as to one-way paging.
235-37).

(R. at

The PSCU's interpretation revealed for the first time

the fact that the Utah Legislature did not grant regulatory
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jurisdiction over one-way paging services to the PSCU.

In the

Matter of Page America of Utah, Inc., Order on Motion for
Exempt Certificate, Case No. 83-082-01 (November 28, 1983).
See Addendum E.

In response to Industrial's challenge against

the validity of the PSCU's interpretation of jurisdiction over
one-way paging, this Court simply stated that:
the pivotal question [was] whether the decision
announced by the Commission in the June letter
amounted to a rule
* * * *

interpreting the definition of "rule" contained in
§ 63-46-3(4), [and] in light of these considerations,
leads us to the conclusion that the Commission was
engaged in rulemaking and had to follow the requirements of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(Emphasis added.)
Williams, 720 P.2d at 776.

The only statute that this Court

directed the PSCU to follow was the Administrative Rulemaking
Act:

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(3).

Thus, the proper method of

interpreting the PSCU's jurisdiction over one-way paging was
and is through Rulemaking, not through deregulation proceedings
which were not even in existence at the time the Williams case
was presented to this Court.
2.

Industrial fails to distinguish between Statutory
Interpretation and Deregulation.

Rulemaking contemplates classification of law, jurisdiction
and other matters.

Deregulation assumes that jurisdiction to

regulate exists and contemplates an exemption from such regulatory jurisdiction.

It is impossible for the PSCU to exempt
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something from regulation which is not even subject to its
jurisdiction.

The issue of whether or not the PSCU has statu-

tory jurisdiction over one-way paging has never been addressed
by this Court until now.

Thus, deregulation proceedings by the

PSCU would be unnecessary and premature.

On the other hand,

the PSCU could, through Rulemaking, clearly interpret the scope
of jurisdiction given it by the Utah Legislature.
In Williams, this Court noted that in the prior case of
Medi-Call, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273,
470 P.2d 258, 260-61 (1970), it "did not reach the issue of
whether publicly available paging service . • . would be a
public utility . . ."

In the Medi-Call case, this Court held

that one-way paging service, operated in the private sector by
physicians, is not a public utility service and cannot be
regulated by PSCU.

Thus, until 1983, when the PSCU determined

that it has no jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging
services, neither the Commission nor this Court had addressed
the specific issue relative to jurisdiction over commercial
one-way paging.
Nowhere in the Williams opinion did this Court state that
one-way paging is a public utility service under the definitions then contained in the Public Utilities Act nor did this
court indicate that it was deciding anything but the procedural
rulemaking issue.

Therefore, any other commentary is not

binding and is properly characterized as obiter dicta.
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More-

over, this Court in Williams was addressing the grievances of
certificate holders, to the effect that proper procedure had
not been followed to protect the interests of existing one-way
paging service providers.

In this proceeding, this Court

focuses on the rights and duties of the PSCU and of American
Paging, a company which has made every attempt to comply with
the law but which now finds itself caught in the cross-fire of
a dispute over PSCU jurisdiction.
In Williams, this Court left the jurisdictional determination to the PSCU, to be resolved in a later rulemaking proceeding pursuant to the expertise of the PSCU.

This Court

stated:
the jurisdictional issue [PSCU jurisdiction over
one-way paging] likely will be resolved by a rulemaking proceeding on remand and will obviate the need for
further proceedings. . . . (Emphasis added.)
Williams, 720 P.2d at 777.

The PSCU has now complied with the

Supreme Court's directive and has, through a proper rulemaking
procedure, again determined that it lacks jurisdiction over
one-way paging services.
B.

(R. at 235-242.)

The PSCU Complied With This Court's Mandate In The
Williams Decision By Following The Requirements And
Procedures Of The Administrative Rulemaking Act,
Obviating The Need For Further Proceedings Concerning
Jurisdiction Over One-Way Paging.

The PSCU complied with the requirements of the Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4 (1985) because
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it:

(1) provided adequate notice; and (2) fully complied with

the requirements of rulemaking procedures.
1.

The PSCU Provided Adequate Notice Pursuant To
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(2) and (4) (1985).

The notice requirements of section 63-46a-4 provide that:
Each agency shall file its proposed rule and rule
analysis form with the office . . . .
The form and
proposed rule . . . shall be published in the next
issue of the bulletin.
* * * *

A copy of the rule analysis shall be mailed to all
persons who have made timely requests to the agency
for advance notice of its rulemaking proceedings, and
to any other person who by statutory or federal
mandate, or in the judgment of the agency, should also
receive notice.
In the instant case, the rule was published as required.
(R. at 236.)

In addition, Industrial received actual manual

delivery of notice by Chairman Cameron himself.
brief at 9.)

(Industrial's

Industrial acknowledges the fact that it received

a hand delivered copy of Notice of Proposed Rule Change during
a scheduling conference in a related proceeding.
24-25.)

(R. at

By providing actual manual delivery of Notice of

Proposed Rule Change to Industrial, the PSCU exceeded necessary
notice requirements pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(4).
Furthermore, Industrial has not demonstrated and the record
does not reflect that Industrial made a "timely request to the
PSCU for advance notice of its rulemaking."

Under such circum-

stances the mailing of notice is a discretionary matter for the
-27-

PSCU, not an absolute right.

The fact that notice was not

mailed through the postal service does not make actual manual
delivery ineffectual notice.

Although Industrial alleges that

it did not receive proper notice because notice was not "mailed
to it," such technical statutory interpretive hair-splitting
does not further the statute's objective of notice, especially
when there is actual manual delivery of notice coupled with
acknowledgement of receipt thereof.
Notice is notice.

Plaintiff's objection that no notice was

given to "other interested parties" is not sustained by the
record, nor is it required by statute.

Moreover, proper notice

was given in the Utah Bulletin, and any other notice to any
other person is a discretionary matter which must be decided
"in the judgment of the agency. . . . "
§ 63-46a-4(4).
2.

Utah Code Ann.

(R. at 236.)
The PSCU complied with the requirements of
rulemaking pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 63-46a-4(3) (1985).

It is clear that the Notice of Proposed Rule Change provided justifications for the PSCU jurisdictional interpretation.

The PSCU's summary of the rule states:

The Public Service Commission of Utah does not have
jurisdiction over one-way paging services. The reason
for the rule is that one-way paging service does not
fall within the definition of a "telephone corporation" in that such service does not utilize a "telephone line." (Emphasis added.)
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Section 63-46a-4(3)(a).

The justification for the PSCU's

jurisdictional interpretation is that because one-way paging
does not fall within the definition of telephone corporation in
that it does not utilize a telephone line, one-way paging does
not fall within the definition of a public utility which is
subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the PSCU. (R. at
20.)

Section 63-46a-4(3)(b).

The rule analysis form for PSCU Rule No. 8304 also stated
that the statutory authority upon which the rule was based:
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 and Supreme Court Case No. 19867.
Williams decision).

(The

See Section 63-46a-4(3)(c).

The Notice of Proposed Rule No. 8304 also contained statements that:

(1) there was no anticipated cost impact of the

rule; See Section 63-46a-4(d); (2) the full text of the proposed administrative rule was published in the Utah State
Bulletin; See Section 63-46a-4(3)(e); (3) interested persons
could present their views on the rule by requesting a hearing
in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46a-5(1)(b) or by written comment; See Section
63-46a-4(3)(f).

Industrial failed to request a hearing pursu-

ant to § 63-46a-4(3)(g), but did file written objections to the
proposed rule.

In addition, the proposed rule included the

name of David L. Stott and Joe Dunlop and the address and
telephone number for contacting agency employees; See Section
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63-46a~4(3)(h), and the signature of Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
of the PSCU; See Section 63-46a-4(3)(i).

(R. at 20.)

By providing the above-referenced materials in the rule
analysis form, the PSCU properly fulfilled all rulemaking
procedural requirements, and thus, created a valid and enforceable PSCU Rule.
POINT III
THE NEWLY ENACTED CHAPTER 8b OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT DOES NOT ENLARGE PSCU JURISDICTION TO INCLUDE ONE-WAY PAGING.
This Court has never addressed the issue of whether or not
the PSCU has statutory jurisdiction over commercially offered
one-way paging services pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 et
seq.

See Argument supra at Point II.A(l).

The Williams

decision did not reach the substantive issues of PSCU jurisdiction, but confined itself to the procedural issues arising out
of the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
5, n.2.)

(Petitioner's Brief at

Since the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l et

seq. (1985) do not enlarge PSCU jurisdiction over service for
which jurisdiction is excluded, as is the case with one-way
paging, Section 8b is wholly inapplicable to the jurisdictional
question at issue in the instant case.

The PSCU did not

attempt to follow the procedural requirements of Chapter 8b in
issuing Rule 8304 because the PSCU engaged in Rulemaking, not
deregulation.
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Industrial's failure to distinguish between Rulemaking,
Deregulation and the impact of Chapter 8b is best illustrated
by Industrial's contradicting arguments:

On one hand Indus-

trial maintains that the Williams decision decided only procedural issues (Petitioner's brief at 5, n.2) and on the other
hand Industrial suggests that the Williams decisions determined
the substantive issue regarding PSCU jurisdiction over one-way
paging.

(Petitioner's Brief at 21.)

Industrial's misunder-

standing is clarified by an analysis of the Telecommunications
Act.

Utah Code Ann., § 54-8b-l et se^. (1985).
The PSCU has officially determined that the recent legisla-

tion resulting in Chapter 54-8b which relates to its increased
powers to deregulate telephone services does not expand its
jurisdiction to include the regulation of one-way paging
services.

(R. at 270-71.)

The Telecommunications Utility Act states that it is for
the purpose of "providing a method of exempting certain
services from regulation."

Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(l) states

that the PSCU is "vested with power to partially or wholly
exempt from any requirement of this title any
telecommunications corpora- tion or public telecommunications
service in this state."

In Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(2), the

legislature provided a mechan- ism which the PSCU may use to
exempt such services from regula- tion.
§ 54-8b-9 (1985), the Utah Legislature
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In Utah Code Ann.

clarified its position concerning the PSCU's jurisdiction over
public utilities by stating that:
Nothing in the chapter shall be construed to enlarge
or reduce the Commission jurisdiction over the services and entities for which jurisdiction is provided
or excluded by other provisions of this title.
When construed together, these combined sections indicate a
legislative purpose to reduce regulatory authority over telecommunications services, without disturbing PSCU jurisdiction
previously defined by statute.
Departure from the literal language and meaning of a
statute is not justified when such a construction produces an
absurd or unjust result, inconsistent with the purposes and
policies of the act in question.
Section 45.12.
(R. at 177-200.)

2A Sutherland Stat. Const, at

See Brief of the Division of Public Utilities.
Departure from the literal language of the

Public Utilities Act creates a forced interpretation which has
been rejected by the PSCU because it produces results that are
inconsistent with the avowed purposes of the Telecommunications
Act.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l(3).

Additionally, the broad

definitions contained in Chapter 8b cannot enlarge or reduce
previous PSCU jurisdiction.
First, as noted above, such a broad and all-encompassing
interpretation of the Act results in a contradictory reading of
the statute taken as a whole.

A broad interpretation of the

Act would result in the unintended regulation of previously
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unregulated transmissions such as one-way radio and television
broadcasts, in addition to two-way broadcasts, such as talk
shows, all in direct violation of the Section 54-8b-9 limitation.
Second, by analogy, the PSCU acknowledged this argument in
its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30), noting that
if one focuses on the phrase "facilitate telephone communication," the scope of potentially regulated services becomes
staggering.

Regulation under such an interpretation would

include all suppliers of telephone equipment, wiring components, telephone directories, all answering services, radio
talk stations, etc.

Because such interpretations produce

unintended results, the PSCU adopted the more reasonable
interpretation, finding that the statutory emphasis was on
interactive two-way communication.
Third, the explicit purpose of Chapter 54-8b is to deregulate telecommunications services over which the PSCU now has
statutory jurisdiction and which exist in a competitive
environment.

In contrast, the rationale for regulation of

public utilities is the need to control monopoly power, which
usually arises as a consequence of economies of scale in
production or limits on entry into a particular business.
Neither of these conditions, which could lead to monopoly
power, are present in the one-way paging industry.
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Therefore, the PSCU is entitled to a presumption that it is
correct in its interpretation of its jurisdictional power and
the effect of the Chapter 8b legislation.

Colman, 403 P.2d at

784.
POINT IV
PSCU RULE NO. 8304 REGARDING LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER ONE-WAY PAGING DOES NOT IMPACT
CERTIFICATE HOLDERS' CONSTITUTIONAL DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS.
The fifth amendment states in pertinent part:

"nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

U.S. Const. Amend. V.

This protection is applicable

to the states through the fourteenth amendment.

The Utah due

process provision provides that "no person shall be deprived of
life liberty or property, without due process of law.

Utah

Const. Art. I, § 7.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated
that no "set formula" exists to determine whether a taking
results in a denial of due process.

Consequently, the Court

must engage in "essentially ad hoc factual inquiries" to make
such a determination.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

In almost all cases, a determination of whether or not a
taking has occurred concerns:

(1) a permanent physical inva-

sion or occupation of real property by government; (2) a
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temporary physical invasion by government; or (3) government
regulation constituting either regulation of use of property or
a denial of a right to use property.

Traditional taking

analyses with respect to certificates of authority involve
protests against restricting authority, not protests against
jurisdictional interpretations resulting in complete nonregulation, and creation of free market conditions.
However, in the case of regulation or non-regulation, the
United States Supreme Court has stated the standard for determining whether a taking has occurred.

In Loretto v. Tele-

prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (citation omitted), the Court stated:
[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference . . . can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when [the] interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good." _I_d. (citation omitted).
Likewise, in Penn Central, the Supreme Court identified the two
most significant factors with which to determine if a government action is unduly oppressive:

(1) the economic impact of

the regulation (or non-regulation in this case) on the property
holder; and (2) the character of the government action.

_I_d. at

124-136.
In the instant case, there is a complete withdrawal by the
PSCU from regulation of one-way paging, and thus, absolutely no
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interference by the State with Industrial's or any other paging
company's one-way paging service.

The non-regulation of

one-way paging is supported by the Federal Communications
Commission's ("FCC") deregulation of radio frequencies for use
in paging services.2

Thus, non-regulation by the PSCU due to

a lack of jurisdiction over one-way paging is best characterized as an effort to aid the FCC in its effort to adjust the
benefits and burdens upon communications networks, to increase
and promote the common good of United States citizens.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
Under the first Penn Central factor, there is no significant economic impact upon Industrial or any other certificate
holder because certificate holders still have their freedom to
operate one-way paging services.

Moreover, certificate holders

never had any assurance of a noncompetitive one-way paging
market, even when mistakenly regulated by the PSCU.

The PSCU

had already created a competitive market for Industrial by

See 47 C.F.R. 22.501(a)(1) and (4), (d), and (p)(l)
(1983). The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has
now issued an Order in In the Matter of State Entry Regulation in the Public Land Mobile Service, C.C. Docket
No, 85-89, RM-811 (May 17, 1985), preempting state entry
laws and regulations which have the effect of prohibiting
or impeding the entry of FCC licensed mobile radio carries
into state markets. The FCC Order is currently pending
court review.
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issuing a certificate to Mobile Telephone and it could have
granted more one-way paging certificates as it determined to be
in the public interest.

Thus, Industrial had no expectation of

a non-competitive market.

Furthermore, even assuming arguendo

that relief from the burden of regulation does have a negative
impact on the value of Industrial's paging service, such a
circumstance is not conclusive as to a government taking.

For

example, in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court upheld a regulation reducing
the owner's property value by 75%.

And in Hadacheck v.

Sabastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the Supreme Court upheld a
regulation reducing the plaintiff's property value by 87-1/2%.
Consequently, without more, a reduction of value of a paging
service through non-regulation and cancellation of certificates
is not enough to invalidate PSCU jurisdictional Rule No. 8304
on constitutional grounds.
The courts have determined that the second Penn Central
factor, the character of the governmental intrusion, is akin to
a continuum where the closer the property interference is to a
physical intrusion, the more likely the interference will be
considered an unreasonable exercise of the police power.

A

Utah Federal District Court decision reasoned that a taking
must deprive the owner of all reasonable use of property or
there is no violation of due process under Utah law.
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Katsos v.

Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D. Utah 1986)
(applying Utah law).
In the instant case, Industrial has not been deprived of
any use of property, and more importantly, any and all government interference has been removed.

The PSCU Rule at issue

clearly allows Industrial to use its paging service as it would
have used it absent the PSCU Rule.

Hence, "the law does not

interfere with what must be regarded as [Industrial's] . . .
primary expectation of the property.
136.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at

Industrial's primary expectation of its property interest

in the PSCU Certificate is and was the operation of a paging
service.

This property interest remains undisturbed by PSCU

Rule No. 8304.

Industrial has no claim of due process viola-

tions or estoppel because there is no taking and no detrimental
reliance under the facts of this case.

Therefore, under this

Court's traditional analysis and that of the United States
Supreme Court (i.e., considering the economic impact, presence
of public interests and lack of governmental intrusion),
non-regulation of one-way paging due to lack of jurisdiction is
constitutional.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, American Paging respectfully requests this Court to uphold the validity and enforceability of PSCU Rule No. 8304 and the PSCU's Order granting
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American Paging's Motion to Dismiss Its Application for Certificate of Convenience and Necessity.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Hi ~

day of October, 1986.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

^^/f^^^
L a r r y R.

Attorneys

SCM3026A
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. , § 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986|)
Public Utilities Definitions:
When used in this title:
k

k

k

k

(30) "Telephone corporation11 (includes every
corporation and person, their les!sees, trustees,
and receivers, owning, controlling, operating,
or managing any telephone line fojr public service within this state, provided, however, that
all corporations, partnerships, or firms providing intrastate cellular telephone service
shall cease to be "telephone corporations" nine
months after both the wire-line and the nonwireline cellular service providers have been issued
covering licenses by the Federal Communications
Commission. It does not include any person
which provides, on a resale basis , any telephone
or telecommunication service whic!h is purchased
from a telephone corporation,
(31) "Telephone line" included all conduits,
ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and
applicances, and all other real estate, fixtures,
and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection wijth or to facilitate communication by telephone vJhether that communication is had with or withoutl the use of
transmission wires.

ADDENDUM B
Utah Code Ann., § 63-46a-4(2), (3) and (4) (1985).
Administrative Rulemaking Procedure:
*

*

* "k

(2) Each agency shall file it^ proposed
rule and rule analysis form with the office.
Rule amendments shall be marked, with new
language underlined and deleted language interlined. The form and proposed rule, unless
the rule is too long as determined by the
office, shall be published in th£ next issue
of the bulletin.
(3)

The rule analysis form shall contain:
(a)

a summary of the rul^ or change;

(b) the purpose of the riile or reason for the change;
(c) the statutory authority or federal requirement for the rule;
(d) the anticipated cost or savings
to the state budget and compliance cost
for affected persons;
(e) how interested persons may inspect the full text of the rul^;
(f) how interested persons may present their views on the rule;
(g) the time and place of any
scheduled public hearing;
(h) the name and telephone number
of an agency employee who may be contacted about the rule; and
(i) the signature of the agency
head or designee.

B-l

(4) A copy of the rule analysis form shall be
mailed to all persons who have made timely request of the agency for advance notice of its
rulemaking proceedings, and to any other person
who, by statutory or federal mandate, or in the
judgment of the agency, should also receive
notice.
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ADDENDUM C
Utah Code Ann., § 54-8b-l et seq. (1985).
PSC JURISDICTION OVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATIONS
1985
GENERAL SESSION
Enrolled Copy
S. B. No. 102

By

Lyle W. Hillyard
Glade M. Sowards
Omar B. Bunnell

AN ACT RELATING TO THE PUBLIC
THE

AUTHORITY

OF

THE

SERVICE

COMMISSION;

CLARIFYING

PSC TO REGULATE INTRASTATE PUBLIC

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES; AND

PROVIDING

A

METHOD

OF

EXEMPTING CERTAIN SERVICES FROM REGULATION.
THIS

ACT

AFFECTS

SECTIONS

OF

UTAH

CODE

ANNOTATED 1953 AS

FOLLOWS:
ENACTS:
CHAPTER 8b, TITLE 54, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 19p3
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state Of Utah:
Section 1.

Chapter 8b, Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953,

is enacted to read:
54-8b-l.

This

chapter

is

known

as

the

"Public

Telecommunications Utility Lav."
54-8b-2.

As used in this chapter:

(1)

"Commission" means the Public Service| Commission.

(2)

"Intrastate

telecommunications

service"

means

any

telecommunj cations service in which the informjation transmitted
originates and terminates within the boundariejs of this
(3)

"Public

transmission
messages,

of

data,

telecommunications
signs,
or

signals,

other

services"

writing,

state.

means

images,

the

sounds,

information of anjy nature by wire,

radio, lightwaves, or other electromagnetic

mjeans

offered

to

the public generally.
(4)

"Telecommunications

corporation"

|

means

every

corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, receivers,

or

S. B. No. 102
trustees

appointed

by

any

court,

operating, managing, or reselling a

owning,

public

controlling,

telecommunications

service.
54-8b-3.

(1)

The

commission

is

vested with power and

jurisdiction to partially or wholly exempt from any requirement
of this title

any

telecommunications

corporation

or

public

telecommunications service in this state.
(2)

The

commission,

on its own initiative or in response

to an application by a telecommunications corporation or a user
of a

public

notice
issue

telecommunications

and
an

an

may,

after

for

a hearing, make findings and

specifying

its

requirements,

terms,

either

state if

and

exempting any telecommunications corporation or any

public telecommunications service from any requirement of
title

public

opportunity

order

conditions

service,

for

the

corporation

a specific geographic area or in the entire

commission
or

this

service

finds
is

that

the

telecommunications

subject to effective competition,

that customers of the telecommunications corporation or service
have

reasonably

available

telecommunications

corporation

alternatives,
or

service

and
does

captive customer base, and if such exemption is in
interest
to

exempt

of the citizens of the state.
any

telecommunications

telecommunications

corporation

not serve a
the

public

or

public

service from any requirement of this title,
factors

including,

not limited to; (a) the number of other providers offering

similar services; (b) the intrastate market
share

the

In determining whether

the commission shall consider all relevant
but

that

within

the

state

of

Utah

of

power

and

market

the telecommunications

corporation requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate

market

power and market share of other providers; (d) the existence of

C -2-

S. B. No. 102
other

providers

to

make

functionally

equivalent

readily available at competitive rates, terms, land
(e)

the

effect

of

exemption

on

the

requirements of the telecommunications

services

conditions;

regulated

corporation

revenue

requesting

an exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other providers into the
marketplace;

(g) the overall impact of exemption on the public

interest; (h) the integrity of all
proposed
the

market;

economic

corporations;

(i)

providers

in

the

the cost of providing quch service; (j)

impact
and

service

(k)

on

existing

whether

telecommunications

competition

will promote the

provision of adequate services at just and reasonable rates.
(3)
for

The commission shall approve or deny

exemption

application

under this section within 240 4ays, except that

the commission may by order
30-day

,any

period.

If

the

defer

action

commission

has

forf

an

no^

acted

application within the permitted time period,

additional

the

on

any

application

shall be deemed granted.
54-8b-4.
or

(1)

The commission may enter an order partially

wholly exempting any public telecommunications service from

any requirement of this title as to rates,
and

may

authorize

the

provision

to

any

statecji

or

fares

negotiated

person that is committed to the acquisition of,

through construction, lease, or any other font^of
comparable

or

of all or!any portion of a

public telecommunications service under
terms

tariffs,

telecommunications

services

from; an

acquisition,
alternative

source of supply.
(2)

Telecommunications corporations may negotiate with the

person or entity for the provision of public telecommunications
services without regard to the provisions
file

of

any

tariffs *on

and approved by the commission, but any rate, toll, fare,

C-3-

S. B. No. 102
rental, charge, or classification of service in such

contracts

shall be fully compensatory.
(3)

Within

ten

days

after

the

conclusion

negotiations and prior to the execution of
telecommunications

corporation

any

of

the

contract,

the

shall file with the commission

the proposed final agreements and other evidence of the
telecommunications

services

to

be provided together with the

charges and other conditions of the
may

approve

or

deny

an

application
contract

service.

application

competitive contract within

30

days

of

The

commission

for

approval

the

filing

of
of

shall

become
of

effective.

approval

The

commission,

the

in

of the competitive contract, shall

consider all relevant factors, including, but not

limited

to,

the contract for any rate, toll, fare, rental, charge,

or classification of service covers the cost of providing
service,

provides

integrity

of

other

upon

telecommunications corporations.

competitive contract has become effective
next

such

for adequate service at just and reasonable

rates, and does not have significant adverse effects

the

a

by the telecommunications corporation or the final

consideration

whether

public

general

rate

case

corporation, shall review the

for

the

that

After a

commission,

in

telecommunications

consistent

with

the

subsection,

and

shall

make

any

adjustment in its rate order, including,

but

not

factors

stated

retroactive
avoid

cross

in

this

adjustment,

limited

to

deemed necessary by the commission to

subsidization

telecommunications

contract,

the

from

services.

other

regulated

intrastate

Any costs incurred in fulfilling

the terms of a competitive contract may not be
the regulated rate base.

C-4-

recovered

from

S. B. No. 102
(4)

Any

telecommunications

corporation

that

provides

public telecommunications services under a competitive contract
may not offer the services under

contract

ifl

a

manner

that

unfairly discriminates between customers.
54-8b-5.

The

telecommunications

corporation

making

application for approval of a contract shall publish notice
that

application

under

rules enacted by the commission.

commission, at its discretion or in

response

to

a

of
The

protested

application, may hold a hearing as provided in Sections 54-7-10
and

54-7-12, and the 30-day time limit of Section 54-8b-3 does

not apply.
54-8b-6.

A

telecommunications

corporation

providing

intrastate public telecommunications services may not subsidize
from

those

services

subject to regulation under this chapter

services which are not regulated.
54-8b-7.

The

jurisdiction

commission

over

every

shall

retain

telecommunications

corporation

public telecommunications service exempted uncler
and

may

exercise

any

statutory

thereto, including the power to
approving

an

grant

revoke

54-8b-3

if

or

exemption from regulation.

(2),

after
the

considering

commission

the

finds

this

or

chapter

ofl power pertaining
modify

any

order

The commission, may,

after notice and hearing, revoke or modify an
exemption,

continuous

order

factprs
such

approving

in Subsection

modification

or

revocation to be in the public interest.
54-8b-8.

Nothing

in

preempt, modify, exempt,
right,

this

chapter

abrogate,

or

shall

otherwise

in

any

way

affect

any

cause of action, liability, duty, or bbligation arising

from any federal, state, or local law governing unfair business
practices

or

antitrust,

restraint

anti-competitive activity.

C-5-

of

trade,

or

other

S. B. No. 102
54-8b-9.
enlarge
services

or
and

Nothing
reduce

the

entities

in

this chapter shall be construed tc

commission's
for

jurisdiction

over

the

which jurisdiction is provided or

excluded by other provisions of this title.
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ADDENDUM D
WILLIAMS v. PUBLIC SI flVICE COMTS OF UTAH
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Cite as 720 P^d 73 (Utah 1986)

David R. WILLIAMS, dba Industrial
Communications, Petitioner,
v.
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chairman; David R. Irvine, Commissioner,
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Respondents.
MOBILE TELEPHONE, INC., a
corporation, Petitioner,
v.
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chairman, David R. Irvine, Commissioner,
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Respondents.
Nos. 19867, 19873.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 4, 1986.
Appeal was taken from order of the
Public Service Commission holding that
Commission had no authority to regulate
one-way mobile telephone paging services.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that Public Service Commission's decision
that no certificate of public convenience
and necessity was necessary to operate
one-way mobile telephone paging service,
announced in letter to prospective operator,
was a "rule" within meaning of Administrative Rule Making Act so that Commission was required to follow Act's procedural requirements.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Telecommunications <3=>461
Public Service Commission's decision
that no certificate of public convenience
and necessity was necessary to operate
one-way mobile telephone paging service,
announced in letter to prospective operator,
was a "rule" within meaning of Administrative Rule Making Act [U.C.A.1953, 6346-3(4) (Repealed)], so that Commission
was required to follow Act's procedural
D-l

requirements. U.C.A.1953, 54-1-1 et seq.,
54-1-1.6, 54-7-1.5, 54-7-13, 63-46a-l et
seq, 63-46a-2(8), 63-46a-3(3)(a), 63-46a-4;
U.C.A.1953, 63-46-1, 63-46-3(4), 63-46-5
(Repealed); Const Art 1, § 7; U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Telecommunications e=>461
Commissioners on Public Service Commission who had participated in decision
that no certificate of public convenience
was required to operate one-way mobile
telephone paging service, announced in letter to prospective pperator, would not be
precluded from considering the jurisdictional matter on remand on basis that they had
violated statutory prohibitions against ex
parte communications, where prospective
operator was not party to any proceeding
pending before Coinmission at time letter
was issued. U.C.Ah1953, 54-7-1.5.

Keith E. Taylor, F. Robert Reeder, Michael L. Larsen, Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt
Lake City, for petitioner.
David L. Stott, Stuart L Poelman, Salt
Lake City, for int^rvenor Amer. Paging.
Stephen R. Randle, Salt Lake City, for
Page Amer.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig
Rich, Asst Atty. Qen., Salt Lake City, for
respondents.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Petitioners Industrial Communications
and Mobile Telephone, Inc., appeal from an
order of the Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission") holding that the Commission has no authority to regulate oneway mobile telephone paging services. Petitioners allege, inter alia, that the Commission did not fopow proper administrative procedures in Concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction. We agree that the Commission failed to adliere to proper requirements in ruling on, the jurisdictional issue,
and accordingly reverse and remand for a
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new hearing that comports with the applicable statutes.
Understanding the history of the Commission's assertion of regulatory authority
over one-way paging services is important
to this case. In 1962, the Commission
granted a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to operate both a two-way
mobile telephone system and a one-way
paging service to petitioner Mobile Telephone, Inc. By this action, and without
objection from any party, the Commission
assumed jurisdiction over both one-way
paging and two-way mobile telephone services under sections 54-2-1(21), (22), and
(30) of the Code.1 Between 1962 and 1983
the Commission granted similar dual authority certificates to three other companies. In 1974, the Commission granted to
Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc., a
single authority certificate covering only
one-way paging service. From the record,
it appears that the Commission has, on
occasion, denied requests for certificates
for one-way paging authority. Until 1983,
however, the Commission's authority to
regulate one-way paging services was not
questioned.
In the early 1980's, the Federal Communications Commission deregulated radio
frequencies for use in paging services.
Sixty-nine channels were made available in
1. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-2-1(30) (Repl. Vol 6A,
1974), states in part 'The term 'public utility'
includes every
telephone corporation
where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to the public generally
Subsection (22) states.
The term "telephone corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling,
operating or managing any telephone line for
public service within this state
Subsection (21) states
The term "telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments
and appliances, and all other real estate and
fixtures and personal property owned, controlled, operated or managed in connection
with or to facilitate communication by telephone whether such communication is had
with or without the use of transmission wires.
2.

See 47 C.FR. 22 501(a)(1) and (4), (d) and
<p)(l) (1983)

D-2

Utah on a first-come, first-served basis.2
Page America, Inc., American Paging, Inc.,
and United Paging Corporation each received a permit from the Federal Communications Commission to operate on one of
the new frequencies early in 1983.3 In
May of 1983, American Pagmg's attorney
contacted Commissioner Irvine to inquire
whether American Paging could operate a
one-way paging system without a certificate. At the request of this attorney, Commissioner Irvine discussed the issue with
the other commissioners. Thereafter, the
Commission sent a letter to the attorney
for American Paging, dated June 3, 1983,
stating that in the Commission's opinion, no
certificate was required. It added that the
Commission would not request a hearing
on the issue 4 That letter is the basis of
the controversy here.
In August of 1983, Page America applied
for a certificate to operate a paging service; petitioner Industrial Communications
protested the application. The Commission
scheduled a public hearing on the application for December of 1983, indicating its
desire to "review" its jurisdiction over oneway paging services. Page America later
moved for a determination that it was exempt from regulation. The Commission
scheduled a hearing on that motion for
November 7th.
3. After receiving its permit from the FCC, United Paging Corporation applied to the Commission for a certificate of convenience and necessity, which application was pending at the time
of the Commission's hearing now under review
United Paging did not take part in that hearing
and its present status is not apparent from the
record.
4. The letter read in pertinent partInasmuch as American Paging of Utah is proposing to offer only one way paging service,
rather than telephone service as defined in the
Utah Code, it does not appear necessary for
your client to file an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity As
a matter of policy the Commission does not
construe its jurisdiction on an informal basis,
but deems the statute sufficiently clear on its
fact that it would not, on its own motion,
require a hearing with respect to your proposed operation.
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Meanwhile, American Paging had begun
operations without a certificate in reliance
'on the Commission's June letter declining
to exercise jurisdiction. Industrial Communications therefore asked the Commission
to issue a cease and desist order to stop
American Paging from operating without a
certificate. A hearing on the cease and
desist request was held October 24, 1983.
At that hearing, the Commission admitted
it was in a dilemma inasmuch as it had
"contradicted itself somewhat by the issuance of the June 3rd, 1983 letter." The
Commission refused to order American
Paging to stop operations; however, it ordered American Paging not to accept new
customers until after the November hearing on Page America's certificate at which
the jurisdictional issue would be reviewed.
Following the November hearing, the
Commission formally ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services, effectively deregulating that field.
The Commission dismissed Page America's
application for a certificate and cancelled
the certificates of Industrial Communications and Mobile Telephone, Inc., to the
extent they authorized one-way paging services. It also cancelled the certificate
granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern
Utah, Inc., authorizing the operation of a
oneway paging system.5
After the ruling, Industrial Communications, which had opposed deregulation,
sought a reversal of the Commission's order and a disclosure of ex parte communications relating to the jurisdictional issue.
It also moved for a rehearing before a
commission pro tempore, claiming that by
virtue of the June letter to American Paging, the Commission had prejudged the jur5. Two companies not participating in the hearing still hold certificates of convenience and
necessity for one-way paging services.
6. Section 54-1-1.6 of the Code, enacted in 1983
(1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 5), provides for a
commissioner pro tempore to be appointed by
the governor when a commissioner is "temporarily dismissed or disqualified." Commissioners pro tern shall have the qualifications required for public service commissioners,
7. The Utah Rule Making Act was repealed and
replaced in its entirety after the facts giving rise

D-3

isdictional issues.* The Commission acknowledged the Jujie letter and the contacts leading up to it, but refused to set
aside its order for any reason. On appeal,
Industrial Communications and Mobile
Telephone, Inc., challenge the Commission's actions.
The principal procedural point raised by
petitioners is that the Commission's June
letter effectively operated to relinquish the
Commission's jurisdiction over one-way
paging, and stripped petitioners and their
similarly situated competitors of a valuable
property right—theirf certificates. Petitioners argue that under the provisions of the
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, the
hearing provisions pi the Public Service
Commission Act, and the due process clauses of state and federal constitutions, the
June letter constituted a de facto rule making which required tfcat all interested parties be given proper Notice and an opportunity to be heard. Sbe U.C.A., 1953, § 6346-5 (2nd RepL VoL 7A, 1978); U.C.A.,
1953, § 54-7-13 (RepL Vol. 6A, 1974); Utah
Const a r t I, § 7; aid U.S. Const amend.
XIV.
[1] We first inquire whether the Commission's actions complied with the procedural requirements of the statutes governing agency rule making or agency adjudication. Any state agency promulgating a
rule must follow the procedures specified
in that act U.C.A., 11953, § 63-46-1 (2nd
RepL Vol. 7A, 1978).^ A rule is defined as
a "statement of general applicability . . .
that implements or interprets the law or
prescribes the policy of the agency in the
administration of its functions
"
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46-3(4) (2nd RepL Vol.
to this action occurred. Our conclusion would
not be any different ivere we to analyze this
case under the new statute. 1985 Utah Laws ch.
158, § 2. The statute i|ow requires rule making
whenever "agency actions affect a class of persons" and defines a rule as "a statement made
by an agency that applies to a general class of
persons ... [whichl implements or interprets
policy made by statute
" U.C.A-, 1953,
§ 63-46a-3(3Xa). -2(8)|(2nd RepL VoL^A, 1978
and Supp.1985).
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7A, 1978). The Public Utilities Act, also
relied on by petitioners, requires that the
Commission give notice and hold a hearing
before it alters, amends, or rescinds an
order or decision. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-7-13
(Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). Petitioners claim
that the procedural requirements of at
least one of these statutes apply here because the June letter constituted either a
"rule" within the meaning of the Rule Making Act, or an "order" within the meaning
of the Public Utilities Act.

As an initial matter, we note that the
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act
seems most directly on point here. It deals
in some specificity with matters that the
Public Utilities Act covers only inferentially, and the Rule Making Act's provisions do
not appear inconsistent with the earlier enacted utility statute.
The pivotal question is whether the decision announced by the Commission in the
June letter amounted to a rule. It might
be argued that the Commission's action
here is merely legitimate law development
through adjudication as opposed to rule
making. We acknowledge that there is a
variance of opinion on when an agency is
engaged in rule making and must follow
formal rule making procedures, and when
an agency may legitimately proceed by
way of adjudication. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 89 S.Ct.
1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969); and NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct
1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). However, we
think that there are some fundamental

points of reference in this area of the law
that are of assistance in determining
whether the Commission should have prr>
ceeded by formal rule making. Professor
Davis summarized some of these considerations.
Although a retroactive clarification of
uncertain law may be brought about
through adjudication, according to [SEC
v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S. 194 [67 S.Ct.
1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) ] and its many
progency . . . , the problem may be different when an agency through adjudication
makes a change in clear law, as when it
overrules a batch of its own decisions,
especially if private parties have acted in
reliance on the overruled decisions.
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 7:25, at 122 (2d ed. 1978). Interpreting
the definition of "rule" contained in section
63-46-3(4), in light of these considerations,
leads us to the conclusion that the Commission was engaged in rule making and had
to follow the requirements of the Utah
. Administrative Rule Making Act.8
First, the Commission's decision was
generally applicable: by deregulating the
one-way paging market and permitting
open competition in the market, the decision altered the rights of all certificate
holders, despite their explicit reliance on
the Commission's prior interpretation. Second, the letter interpreted the scope of the
Commission's statutory regulatory powers,
thus "interpreting] the law," within the
meaning of the Rule Making Act. More
over, in so acting the Commission, in the
words of Professor Davis, made a "change
in clear law." For over twenty years, the
Commission has interpreted its authority
over telephone corporations to include oneway paging services. It has required certificate holders to file tariffs and pay public
utility sales taxes. It has denied some
requests for certificates. In one case, it
issued a certificate that covered only oneway paging. In Medic-Call, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470
P.2d 258 (1970), the Commission even went

8. For these reasons, section 54-7-1.5, governing
the functions of the Commission when entering

an order, has no application to the June letter
or the proceedings leading up to its issuance.

The Commission argues that the June,
1983, letter was not a rule making within
the meaning of the Utah Rule Making Act
because it did not have general applicability. The Commission also argues that because it had never formally determined
that it had jurisdiction to regulate paging
services under the Public Utilities Act, it
was free to announce its opinion on the
subject without any procedural formalities.
There is no merit to the Commission's arguments.
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to court to defend its' jurisdiction over paging services.9
Under all these circumstances, we conclude that the Commission cannot reverse
its long-settled position regarding the scope
of its jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy change without following the
requirements of the Utah Administrative
Rule Making Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor
Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1981),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 999, 103 S.Ct. 358, 74
L.Ed.2d 394 (1982); see also 2 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 7:25, at
125 (2d ed.1978). These requirements were
not met. Nonparties were not given notice
of the Commission's intention to reconsider
its long-held position in connection with the
June letter. And the November adjudicative hearing certainly cannot be considered
an adequate substitute for a rule making
proceeding. Many of the protections provided for by the Act were missing from
that proceeding, including adequate advance notices to all affected parties, an
opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46a-4 (2d Repl. Vol. 7A,
1978, Supp.1985). Because the requirements of the Act were not satisfied, the
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings.
[2] The next issue is whether the current commissioners should be precluded
from considering the jurisdictional matter
on remand. Petitioners contend that the
commissioners who participated in the decision announced in the June letter had prejudged the jurisdictional issue. Therefore,
they request that we order the recusal of
all the commissioners and the appointment
of a commission pro tempore.
Petitioners assert that recusal is necessary because the opinion announced in the
June letter violated the statutory prohibitions against ex parte communication
about matters pending before the Commission. Section 54-7-1.5 provides in part:

No member of the public service commission . . . shall make or knowingly cause
to be made to any party any communication relevant to the merits of any matter
under adjudication unless notice and an
opportunity to be heard are afforded to
all parties. No party shall make or
knowingly cause to be made to any member of the commission . . . an ex parte
communication relevant to the merits of
any matter under adjudication.
There are several problems with petitioners' argument. By its terms the statute
does not apply to dealings between the
Commission and American Paging. In
May and June of 1983, American Paging
was not a party to any proceeding pending
before the Commission that involved the
question of the Commission's jurisdiction
over one-way paging services. Moreover,
the letter was not an adjudication but, in
substance, a rule making, as we have noted
above. Therefore, any dealings between
American Paging and the commissioners
could not be a communication between a
"party" and a member of the Commission
"relevant to the merits" of "any matter
under adjudication." Second, section 54-71.5 was not effective until July 1, 1983,
almost a month after the letter was written. See 1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 15.
It is true that the later proceedings before the Commission on the application of
Page America for a certificate should be
classified as an "adjudication" within the
meaning of section 54-7-1.5, and that these
proceedings occurred after the effective
date of the statute. However, that does
not change the.nature of the May and June
communications between the Commission
and American Paging nor the fact that the
statute, by its terms, does not apply to
them.
Because the jurisdictional issue likely
will be resolved by a rule making proceeding on remand and will obviate the need for
further proceedings, we need not further

9. This Court ruled in Medic-Call that the PSC
could have no jurisdiction over a private nonprofit paging service because it was not a public
utility. We did not reach the issue of whether a
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consider whether and under what circumstances recusal may be required in administrative adjudications when the specific provisions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply.
Plainly, having participated in a rule making proceeding does not automatically preclude a commissioner from participating in
a later, properly conducted adjudication.
We have considered the other issues
raised and find their disposition unnecessary to the result. The Commission's rule
is of no force and effect, and its order is
vacated. The matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble, and (2) driver's refusal to submit to breath test upon
rumors that there had been incidents of
tampering with breathalyzer in the past
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting defendant to license revocation.
Affirmed.
1. Automobiles 0=144.2(9)
In revocation proceeding, Driver Division has burden to show that operator of
vehicle was in actual physical control of
motor vehicle and that arresting officer
had grounds to believe that operator was
under influence of alcohol.
2. Automobiles <3=>144.2(10)
In trial de novo, district court must
determine by preponderance of evidence
whether driver's license was subject to revocation for driving under the influence of
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10.

Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver
License Services, Utah Department of
Public Safety, Defendant and Respondent
No. 20112.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 12, 1986.
Utah State Driver License Division revoked driving privileges of driver for period of one year. The Seventh District
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. Davidson, J., affirmed the administrative decision. Driver appealed. The Supreme
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs was intended by legislature
to protect public safety and apprehend
drunken driver before he or she strikes and
may not be construed to exclude those

3. Automobiles <s=»144.2(3)
Supreme Court's review of district
court's determination as to whether driver's license was subject to revocation for
driving while under the influence of alcohol
is deferential to trial court's view of evidence unless trial court has misapplied
principles of law or its findings are clearly
against weight of evidence.
4. Automobiles <3=>144.1(1)
Even if truck was inoperable at time
that licensee was found sleeping in it and
arrested, that would not preclude him from
having "actual physical control" over truck
so that his driver's license could be revoked
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alcohol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2).
5. Automobiles <3=>349
Statute providing for arrest of one "in
actual physical control" of vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
was intended by legislature to protect public safety and apprehend drunken driver
before he or she strikes and may not be
construed to exclude those vehicles are
presently immobile because of mechanical
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ADDENDUM E
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter cf the Application Of PAGE AMERICA OF UTAH,
INC. for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity as a
Common Carrier for Furnishing
Paging Service to Areas Within
Salt Lake, Davis, Utah, and
Tooele Counties, Utan.

CASE NO. 83-082- 01
ORE1ER ON MOTION
CZRTIF:GATE
FOR EX

Appearances:
Stephen R. Rancle

For

Stuart L. Poelman

"

Applicant
American Pacing cf Utah,
Inc., amicus curiae

Erintcn R. Burbidge

David R. Williams, dba
Industrial
Communications,
Protestant

X. M. Lewis

"

Mobile Telephone, Inc.,
Protestant

Richard Hinckley,
Assistant Attcrr.e;
General

n

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation,
State cf Utah

By the Commission:
Applicant filed its application in this matter August 10,
1983.

Subsequent thereto, the question arcse whether the Commis-

sion had

jurisdiction

to entertain

said

application, and the

Commission asked for briefs on the matter.

The parties thereaf-

ter asked for an evidentiary hearing for the purpose cf developing the record to describe the nature cf their respective business operations
issue.

as

a basic

for

resolving

the

jurisdictional

Said hearing took place on November 7, 1983, at the hour
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- 2 of 2:00 p.m., before A. Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge
for the Commission.

Evidence was offered and received, and the

Administrative Law Judge, having considered the same, together
with the briefs submitted, new enters the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order based thereon.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Page America of Utah, Inc., hereafter called "Appli-

cant" is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City,
Utah.

It is a subsidiary of Page America Group, Inc., a holding

company with operating
nationwide.
Paging,

companies

Applicant's

Inc.,

appearing

in a large number of states

position
as

amicus

is

supported

curiae,

by

hereafter

American
called

"American," a corporation qualified to do business in the state
of Utah, and which is already operating a paging service, though
without certification from this Commission.
opposed

by

David

R. Williams, cba

The application is

Industrial Communications,

hereafter called "Industrial", and by Mobile Telephone, Inc., a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of
Utah, hereafter called "MTI".

The Division of Public Utilities

also epposes the present motion of the Applicant for an exempt
certificate, and instead asks the Commission to exercise limited
regulatory oversight of pacing service, similar to that which we
exercise over WATS resellers.
2.

Both of the protestants currently hold certificates of

convenience and necessity from this Commission authorizing them

CASE NO. 83-082-01
- 3 to provide mobile radio-telephone service in various parts of the
state, and in conjunction therewith to operate paging service as
well.
and

The grants of authority have been made at various times,

with

a

single

exception

have

provided

for

operate both mobile telephone and paging service.

authority

to

In 1974, the

Commission issued a certificate to Mobile Telephone Service of
Southern Utah, Inc. (which corporation is not a Protestant in
this case) in Case No. 6969 which dealt exclusively with the
provision of paging service, and the Protestants cite that case
to

the

Commission

as

determinitive

that

the

already decided the jurisdictional issue herein.

Commission

has

In one case, to

be discussed hereafter, the Commission did assert jurisdiction
over such service, but that case was reversed by the Utah Supreme
Court, and in view of the Court's disposition of the same, we do
not consider ourselves bound by it.
ter, we do not believe

As we will discuss hereaf-

that the Supreme Court has ruled

in

respect to the Commission's jurisdiction over paging services.
3.

Paging technology has been developing extremely rapidly

over the past ten to fifteen years.
tially

the only method

people

Prior to that time, substan-

had

of

ensuring

that

they be

apprised of all calls when they were away from the phone, was to
employ an answering service.
message

with

the

answering

The calling party would leave a
service,

to

be

relayed

when

the

customer of the answering service phoned in to get the messages.
There was no way to let the customer know immediately when a
message had been left.
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The

"beeper".

first

electronic

improvement

was

a

tone-only

This was an electronic device which could be activated

by a radio signal from the answering service providing a highpitch tone to alert the customer that a message was waiting. The
most prinitive form of this system involves a human activating
the beeper and giving the customer a message when the customer
phones in.

In almost all cases this primitive system has been

superseded by a machine which automatically activates the beeper
and then plays back the caller's message when the customer phones
in*
5.

The next advance in technology was to provide "tone-two

address" service which would enable a customer, by the type of
the tone, to discern which of two numbers to call to get messages.

This type of service has in turn been superseded by "tone

and voice" service, which allows a person to hear the message
after the beeper is activated, thus sparing

the necessity of

phoning in to get messages.

Now on the horizon are two further

advances in the technology:

digital display (already available)

which will display the message in numeric form, obviously in most
cases directing the customer which telephone number to call to
reach the caller.

Digital display is already available in many

parts of the country and has very recently been introduced in the
Salt Lake market.

It is likely to be superseded quite scon by an

"alpha-numeric" display which will enable the customer to receive
a short written message as well as numeric data.
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6.

It is new

foreseeable

that

in

the near

future the

alpha-numeric display will enable the customer to use the services of a "network," which will link him to data bases, and will
enable him to use his service nationwide.

The Applicant and

American are each involved in establishing such a network.

Hone

of the existing certificated carriers in Utah have taken concrete
steps in such a direction.
7.

Despite the rapid advances in th£ technology, and the

potential for greater usefulness, the essential structure of the
service remains the same.

A caller uses th|e telephone system to

reach the service and leave a message.

The message is stored.

There is then a retransmission, either to aiert the customer that
there is a message, or to send it directly |for voice or display.
The retransmission may or may not involve use of the land lines.
The service requires, by way of equipment, £ome means of answering

the

calls,

stcring

the messages,

transmitting

signal, and replaying the stored message.
must be done electronically
signal.

the

alert

The only part which

is the transmission of the alert

Obviously, a manual system for the other part of the

operation would be intolerably cumbersome, and hence automated
equipment to handle these aspects has been available for some
time.

Although this renders the establishment of such a system

expensive, nevertheless, if one compares the capital of such an
operation with that required for a land line telephone system, or
similar fixed utility, they are relatively npdest.

Furthermore,

the operation of such a system does not invqlve the installation

F.-S
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- 6 and maintenance of a wide-spread, expensive physical distribution
system.
8.
located

The Federal Communications
two primary

bands

Commission

for paging

service.

known as the "high band," lies around 900 MHz.
around 35 and 43 MHz.

(FCC) has alOne, commonly
"Low band" lies

The FCC has recently allocated 68 addi-

tional channels for the "high band" and 28 channels in the "low
band".

Between them, the two bands have had only eight channels

heretofore.

The

FCC

has

also

considerably

liberalized

its

criteria for granting new licenses on these bands.
9.

In the wake of the FCC allocation of additional chan-

nels, and relaxation of licensing requirements, there has been a
perceptible trend in a number of states toward relaxing regulation of paging services, or deregulating them altogether.
10.

At present, the Applicant's subsidiaries in a number of

other states are offering tone and voice paging, digital paging,
and in some cases alpha-numeric paging.

They propose to offer

all forms immediately, should they be granted authority, with the
possible exception of alpha-numeric, which may be delayed slightly for technical reasons.

They also propose to offer network

paging as soon as it is available.

American offers the same

present capabilities, and proposes the same future service.
presently offers all forms except alpha-numeric.

MTI

MTI has begun

investigating possible network affiliation, but has no concrete
plans at present.
and

voice.

It

Industrial can presently offer tone, and tone
has

the

technical

capabilities

of

offering

CASE NO. 93-082-01
- 7 digital, but at present has no frequencies available to it for
that purpose.

It expects they will be available, and it proposes

to offer such service as soon as it is possible,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The issue

turns upon the construction

of Utah Code

Annotated 54-2-1 (22) , which gives regulatory jurisdiction to the
Commission over telephone corporations as defined

therein.

An

integral part of that definition incorporates a separate definition of a "telephone line" which U.C.A. 54-2-1 (21) defines to be
"all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables,
instruments and appliances, and all other
real estate and fixtures and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in
connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone whether such communication
is had with or without the use of transmission wires."
2.

Because

the Utah statute uses the terms

"facilitate

communication by telephone whether such communication is had with
or without the use of transmission wires," it simply is not clear
that the Legislature

specifically

intended

to include one-way

paging service within the regulatory jurisdiction of this Commission.

In construing

its

jurisdiction

as

a

matter

of

first

impression, the Commission first considers the plain meaning of
the underlying statute.

Where the statute is ambiguous, as here,

we examine the decisions of courts for guidance in construing the
law; and where reasonably direct guidance is lacking in authoritative case law, we endeavor to apply a prudent judgment grounded in our regulatory experience which takes
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- 8 philosophical and economic bases for affording certain enterprises the unique status of regulated monopolies, as well as
considerations of public interest in receiving necessary utility
service•

The parties in this matter have referred the Commission

to many cases from our own and other states, some of which have
opted for a regulatory plan for paging service, and some which
have not.

The weight of case authority is split, and we are

persuaded by our review of Utah cases that the Utah Supreme Court
has never squarely addressed the Commission's jurisdiction over
paging service,
3.
case

In the 1974 'Mcbile Telephone Service of Southern Utah

(No. 6969) , the Commission granted a paging certificate;

however, two facts are significant with respect to that decision.
First, the application does net appear to have been contested,
and therefore the issue of jurisdiction was net argued before the
Commission in an adversarial context. Second, the Commission made
no findings nor conclusions from which it may be inferred that
the issue of jurisdiction was ever fully

considered, and for

whatever reason, the Commission failed to declare that it had
jurisdiction to issue the certificate.

We conclude as a matter

of law that the Commission had no such jurisdiction, and that the
order in that case was null and void.

We further conclude that

the inclusion of paging service in any certificates issued by the
Commission, authorizing the holders to provide mcbile telephone
service, was error, and that the portions of orders conferring
authority to provide paging service are null and void.
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Protestants

refer

to the Commission's

Order

In the

Matter of the Investiaaticn c f the Practices and ODerations of
Medic-Call , a corporation, Harold

Jensen,

M.D. ,

Professional

Exchance Answerino Service arid Industrial Ccmmunications Company,
-~

•

.I

-

-

-

-

—

Investigation Docket No. 120 (1969), in support of the proposition that this Commission has already squarely faced and decided
the issue of its jurisdiction over paging services.

However, as

we see it, the debate in that proceeding was over the question of
whether or not Medic-Call was offering its service to the public
generally, whereas, in the instant proceeding the debate is over
different questions, one of which is whether or not a paging
service is a telephone corporation within the meaning of our
statutes.

We note that in Medic-Call v. Public Service Commis-

sion, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 P.2d 258 (1970), which is the appeal of
the Commission1s Order in Investigation Docket No. 120, the Court
in its opinion merely assumes arguendo that'a paging service is a
telephone corporation:

here we cannot so assume.

It is also worthwhile to note the rather stinging dicta of
the Court in Medic-Call:
"The service (paging service) is comparable to that which would be rendered by
runners or call boys to notify doctors that
they were wanted on the phone. One wonders
just how the defendant would go about regulating the service even if it had the power
to do so. If defendants can regulate the
service rendered by plaintiffs herein, could
they not with equal propriety regulate the
semaphore signaling of the Boy Scouts or the
smoke signals of the Indians on a hunting
expedition?" (at page 260, 470 P.2d)
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cite

the

opinion

of

the

Supreme

Court

in

Williams v. Hvrum Gibbons & Sens Co., 602 P.2d 684 (1979), to
demonstrate that the term "telephone line" includes the plant,
equipment and facilities used to provide paging

services.

In

Williams the Court construed the meaning of "telephone line" but
did so by stating only that the phrase included "radio-telephone
communications."

The Williams case presented the issue to the

Court in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, and the
question of whether plaintiff had condemnation powers required a
finding that the plaintiff was in fact a public utility.
business

of the plaintiff

for which

eminent domain

The

had been

sought was to install a transmitter to operate radio telephone
and paging service.

The Court didn't specify that paging is to

be treated within the definition of a "telephone line" but relied
mere generally

on

within the broad

"radio-telephone
definition

mission wires11) without
radio-telephone

communications"

as

failing

("whether with or without trans-

identifying

communications.

services which

Clearly,

mobile

constitute
telephone

service is within the meaning of the statute, and the case can be
said to stand for that; however, we conclude that the nature of
pacing service is so fundamentally distinct and different frcm
mobile telephone service that the Court's language in that case
falls short of declaring paging to be a telephone line.
We read the fleeting references to paging service in the
cases to mean that paging has been a distinctly separate service
which

companies

have offered

adjunctively

to

their

customers

CASE NO. 8 3-082-01
- 11 because

the

service

can

technologically

dovetail

with

mobile

telephone service? but the two are not the same in fact, nor
should they be treated the same in law.
5.

The distinction between paging ancj telephone service is

critical because if in defining "telephone line" one focuses on
the phrase

"facilitate telephone communicition," the scope of

potentially regulated services becomes staggering.

Conceivably

the Commission should then regulate all suppliers of telephone
equipment,
suppliers

e.g.
of

Radio

wiring

directories, including

Shack,

Sears,

components?

all

J.C.Penney,
suppliers

of

the many not affiliated with

Panasonic?
telephone
the Bell

system? telephone answering services, telephone answering devices
and all such suppliers? radio talk stations?i newspaper classified
advertising, cad absurdum.

The focus instead should be on the

connotation of telephone service which implies interactive, and
at least potentially extended two-way commlunication.

That was

certainly the focus in 1917 when the statute was enacted, since
most

of

the

services

foreseen at that time.

new

technologically

feasible

were

not

Paging service is conceptually no differ-

ent from answering services

(which have n^ver been considered

appropriate objects of state regulation)? itj is the same service
offered through a different medium.

Telephone service over land

lines or radio waves is fundamentally the same service irrespective of the means of transmission.

But telephone service is a

two-way service? paging service is one-way c4ll notification.
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Finally, we consider it appropriate to evaluate paging

service in the context of the traditional characteristics which
have warranted granting of a state-regulated

monopoly.

ically, legislatures have narrowly circumscribed

Histor-

the conditions

which justify such a departure from a free market economy.
conditions
which

have

generally

included

is deemed

necessary

and

the

providing

essential

existence of natural mcnopolies

because

of

a

Those
service

to the citizenry, the
of

significant

capital

investment necessary to achieve economies of scale in production,
and the efficient use of minimally intrusive rights of way across
land.

An objective

analysis of paging

service persuades us to

conclude the following:
(a)
growing
the

Paging

is

a

valuable

number of pecple.

effect

that

it

has

convenience

Industrial

the

capacity

for

small

presented

information

to

200,000

serve

subscribers, but presently serves approximately
ers.

a

but
to

paging

2,500 subscrib-

While paging is beneficial and efficient in aiding instant

response to telephone calls, we cannot say that the service is a
necessary public

service in the sense

natural

basic

gas

and

telephone

that water, electricity,

service

are

necessary

to

the

well-being of the citizenry, nor can it be said that a significant

number

of

telephone

customers

avail

themselves

of

the

service.
(b)

The capital necessary to provide paging service is net

substantival compared to the capital commitments common to other
utility services*

- 13 (c)

The

public

is

transmission of paging
nienced

by

unlimited

rights of way.

not

inconvenienced

by

the

plant

or

signals in the way it would be inconveelectric

companies

seeking

transmission

Whether there are three or three hundred paging

companies, the intrusion upon land would be tninimal.
(d)
the

FCC

Paging may have been a service in short supply because
imposed

severe

limits

to market

entry

by

restricting

frequencies within the RF spectrum; however, the FCC decision to
release

96

new

frequencies

significantly

alters

the

supply

consideration and represents a major federal policy to liberalize
market access and foster competition in the paging industry.
(e)
to

If competition can produce serviqe and price benefits

paging

customers,

there would

appear

io

be

no

substantial

reason for this Commission to exercise jurisdiction.

Cerrainiy

there would be obvious advantages to the Protestants

if marker

entry were restricted, but the purpose of s^ate regulation isn't
to protect

the interests

of regulated

companies

sake; it is to protect the public interest.

for their own

Conceivably, there

will be many market entrants, and it is likely that seme will
flourish and some will fail.

We see no significant risk to the

public if some providers fail, and we are petsuaded that the open
market will in time be the best safeguard of the public interest,
both in terms of price and service.
(f)
tion

The Protestants urge the Commission to assert jurisdic-

to preclude duplication of facilities * but duplication

is

the essence of competition, and such a policy would be rational
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- 14 only if the investment necessary to launch a paging service were
vastly greater than it is.
7.

The issues

raised

herein demonstrate

that

it

is an

appropriate time to request that our Legislature modernize the
definition of telephone service.

The questions in this case, as

well as the the Commission's decision to assert limited regulatcry oversight of WATS resellers, and the restructuring

of the

telephone industry incident to the break-up of the Bell System
merit a careful evaluation of what ought to be regulated and what
cannot be regulated in order to better serve the communication
requirements of Utahns.

We are attempting to crunch the tech-

nology of 1983 into the terminology of 1917, and there are too
many technological and economic developments to make ambiguous
definitions advisable or workable.
Accordingly, we make the following Order:
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the application
of Page America of Utah, Inc. be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Telephone,
insofar

Inc., Certificate
as

the

same

No.

purports

1414
to

issued
grant

in Case

authority

service be, and the same hereby is, hereby amended

No. 5169,
for

paging

to delete

therefrom any reference to paging service, and that a copy cf
this Order be filed and made effective in said case; and
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- 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity No. 1504 issued in Case No. 5482 to David R. Williams,
dba

Industrial

amended

to

Communications, be,

delete

therefrom

any

and

the

reference

same
to

hereby

mobile

is,

paging

service; and that a copy of this Order be filed and made effective in said case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Telephone Service of Southern Utah Inc. , Certificate No. 1856 issued
in Case No. 6969, insofar as the same grants authority for paging
service, is hereby voided, and that a copy of this Order be filed
and made effective in said case.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this ?8th day of November,
1983.

/s/ A. Robert Thurman,
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and confirmed this 28th day of November, 1982, as
the Report and Order of the Commission.
I si
(SEAL)

I si David R. Irvine, Commissioner
Is/

Attest:
Is/

Brent H. Cameron, Chairman

Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary
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ADDENDUM G
_ T^ppf\t>p rHRrI^ PUBLIC ST7"r?T7Tr,F COMMISSION O17 H T A " In the Matter of the Applica)
tion of AMERICAN PAGING*, INC.
>
(OF UTAH) for a Certificate o* )
Convenience and Necessity to
)
Operate as a Public Utility
)
Rendering Paging Service to the )
General Public in Areas of Box )
Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis,
)
Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch)
and Tooele Counties, Utah.
)

T

CASE ^ 0 . 8 5-2007-01
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS

SSUFD:

Vav 23, 1936

By the Commission:
On or about August 10, 1933, Page America Inc. filed an
application with the Commission to provide one-way paging service.

On November 28, 1983, however, the Commission ruled that

it had no statutory jurisdiction over paging services.

The case

was subsequently appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.
On or about April 30, 1985 American Paging Inc. (American Paging) filed an application with the Commission to provide
one-way paging service to the general public between points in
Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch
and

Tooele

Counties within

that

area.

American

Paging

filed

simultaneously a Motion to Dismiss its Application for the reason
that

the

Commission,

in

its Order

of November

28, 1983, had

determined that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way
paging services.

American Paging also stated that although the

1985 Utah Legislature amended the Public Utilities Act by adding
Chapter

8b. empowering

the

Commission

to wholly

or

partially

exempt certain competitive telecommunication services or service

CAS r NO. 95-?00^-01
- ? providers, said chapter did not expand the Commission's jurisdiction beyond that which it already had.
On or about March 4, 19 86, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the Commissionfs deregulation of one-wav paging was defective

because

the

Commission

had

attempted

the

deregulation

through an Order construing its jurisdiction rather than through
rulemaking under the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Thereafter,

in

accord

Supreme Court, the Commission

with

the

instruction

of

the

filed a notice of proposed rule-

makina with the O ^ i c e of Administrative Rules on April 15, 1986,
which stated that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over
one-wav paging and the reasons for it.
the parties.

No

party

requested

Notice was provided to

a hearing within

the

15-day

period following publication as required by the Utah Administrative

Rulemaking

Act.

The rule was

formally

adopted

and

made

effective May 16, 1986.
The Commission further concludes from the comments and
oral

arguments

o^ the parties

that

Chapter

8B

of

the

Public

Utilities Act of the Utah Code does not expand the jurisdiction
of the Commission to include one-way paging.
Based upon the ^oregoing, the Commission will make the
following:
ORDE^
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Commission, having issued

a rule pursuant to the Utah Administrative

Rulemaking

in accord

Act

and

with

the

direction

of

the

Utah

ra^P ^o. 85-2007-01
- 3 Supreme Court that

it does not have jurisdiction

over one-way

paging services and having further determined that Chapter 8B of
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the
Commission

tc

include

one-way

paging, hereby

grants

American

Paging ! s Motion to Dismiss its Application for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity to provide one-way paging services.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day of May,
1986.
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\

Brent H. Cameron, Chairman

J a % s M. Byrne, Commissioner
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Executive Secretary
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AF^IDA^T OF MAILING

In the Matter o^ the Application
of AMERICAN PAGING, INC. (OF UTAH*
for a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity to Operate as a
Public Utility Rendering Paging
Service to the General Public in
Areas of Box Elder, Weberf Morgan,
Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit,
Wasatch and Tooele Counties, Utah.

CACT-

vc.9

85-20CT-01

ORDER GPA^IMC MOTION TO DISMTSS

Countv o^ Salt Lake )
^

SS,

State of Utah

Brenda Warner, being dulv sworn, deposes and says that she is a secretary regularly
employed in the office of the Public Service Ccrrnission o^ Utah, whose office is
located at 160 East 300 South, fourth Floor, Feber M. Wells State Office Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
That there is a United States Post Office at Salt Lake City, and at the place of
residence or place of business of the persons whose names are set forth below; and
between Salt Lake City and residence or places of business, there is a regular
ccmnunieation by mail.
That on the 23rd day of May, 1986, affiant served a true copy of the hereto attached
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS on the said persons by mailing such copy on said
date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly enclosed in a sealed
envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the following persons,
at the addresses shavn:
* Stuart Poelman
10 Exchange Place
P.O. Box 3000
SLC, UT 84110

-Ocv

Bryan L. McDougal
Judge Building, Ste 735
8 East Broadway
SLC, UT 841H -

Also attached mailing list
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 23rd day of May, 1986.

My Commission Expires
April 10, 1989

Notary Public
Residing7at Salt Lake City, Utah

rinton R. Burbidge
IRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
30 South 300 East
LC, UT 84111
obile Telephone, Inc.
/o Max Bangerter
0 West 2100 South
LC, UT 84110
age America of Utah
/o Stephen R. Randle
NGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER
20 Boston Building
LC, UT 84111
ay M. Lewis
ENSEN & LEWIS
20 South 300 East, No. 1
LC, UT 84111
ommunity Paging Corp.
.0. Box 10
exington, NE
68850
obile Telephone Service of
Southern Utah, Inc.
/o Max Bangerter
0 West 2100 South
LC, UT 84115
. L. Johnson
T&T Communications
600 N. Central Ave., Ste 300
hoenix, AZ
85012
andy L.
ARSONS,
.0. Box
LC, UT

Dryer
BEHLE & LATIMER
11898
84147

atrick J. Oshie
ffice of Attorney General
36 State Capitol
UILDING MAIL
eith E. Taylor
ndustrial Communications
.0. Box 11898
LC, UT 84147
regory B. Monson
ATKISS & CAMPBELL
10 South Main, Ste 1200
LC, UT 84101

Dwight M. Whitley, Jr.
NewVector Communications, Inc.
3350 161st Avenue S.E.
P.O. Box 7329
Bellevue, WA
98008-1329

; Elder News & Journal
;n: Bruce Keyes
gham City, UT
84302
-id Eskelsen
eret News
I. Box 1257
;, UT 84110
,ention: Newsroom
i Enterprise
i. Box 11778
ineer Station
i, UT 84147-0778
V, Inc.
15 South 3600 West
:, UT 84119
ien Standard Examiner
,n: Mark Shenefelt
. - 23rd Street
i. Box 951
Ien, UT
84402
;y Desk
t Lake Tribune
» South Main
:, UT 84111
lited Press International
). Box 1375
:, UT 84111
1 Radio News
I Robins
! East South Temple
;, UT 84111
!I/McGraw-Hill
y Sue White, Editor
South Franklin Turnpike
isey, NJ
07446
in F. Hart
ulatory Attorney
Sprint Communications Corp,
0 Old Bayshore, Ste 580
lingame, CA
94010

F. Robert Reeder, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P.O. Box 11898
SLC, UT 84147
ElC/Intelligence
Lee Cokorinos
Government Acquisitions
48 West 38th Street
New York, NY
10018

J. Randolph MacPherson
Chief Regulatory CounselTelecommunications, DoD
Defense Communications Agency
Attn:
Code H115
Washington, DC
20305-2000

Hershel Rakes, Director
Telephone Services, UMC 37
Utah State University
Logan, UT
84322

Michael Ginsberg
Office of Attorney General
236 State Capitol
BUILDING MIAL

A. Robert Thorup, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
P.O. Box 45385
SLC, UT 84145-0385

Energy Office
355 West North Temple
3 Triad Center, Ste 450
BUILDING MAIL

Kathleen D. Zick
Department of Family & Consumer Studies
University of Utah
Steve Mecham
Salt Lake City, UT
84112
Governor's Office
203 State Capitol
BUILDING
MAIL
Olof E. Zundel
Utility Shareholders Association
of Utah
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Bob Sugino
36 South State
Tax Commission
SLC, UT 84111
Assessed Property Division
BUILDING MAIL
Stephen Randle, Esq.
520 Boston Building
D. C. Petershagen
SLC, UT 84111
State Telecommunications Service
Rm 1226 State Office Building
Ted D. Smith, Esq.
BUILDING MAIL
Mountain Bell Legal Department
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610
SLC, UT 84111
AT&T Communications
W. L. Johnson
2600 N. Central, Ste. 300
Phoenix, AZ
85004
Geoffrey Williams

>mas W. Forsgren, Esq.
ih Power & Light
). Box 899
:, UT 84110
-ol Black, Librarian
{TON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
) South Third East
:. UT 84111

BYU Financial Services
D-148 Abraham Smoot Building
Provo, UT
84602

IOMEGA Corporation
1821 West 4000 South
Roy, UT 84067
Continental Telephone Company
of the West
Emmett Mays
18 East Main
Tremonton, UT
84337

